The ban logic is per source IP, so it only works where the daemon can see the real client. Behind Docker's default bridge networking every client is SNAT'd to the bridge gateway (a 172.16/12 address), so a single IP would stand in for the whole internet -- counting offenses against it would block everyone at once. Add is_bannable_address(): only globally-routable unicast addresses are tracked. Loopback, RFC1918 private, CGNAT (100.64/10), link-local, IPv6 unique-local, and multicast all return false. main.cpp decides trackability from the accepted endpoint and skips both the block check and offense recording for non-global sources. Net effect: banning works where the real IP is visible (FreeBSD jail via pf rdr; Docker with host networking) and is inert -- not catastrophic -- where it is not (Docker bridge). Document the Docker client-IP caveat: docker-compose.yml now defaults to host networking, with the rationale and alternatives in DOCKER.md.
126 lines
4.4 KiB
C++
126 lines
4.4 KiB
C++
#include "ban.hpp"
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#include <boost/asio/ip/address.hpp>
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#include <gtest/gtest.h>
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using namespace std::chrono_literals;
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using clock_t_ = BanTracker::clock;
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// Work well away from the steady_clock epoch so that subtracting the window
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// never underflows and default-constructed time_points are unambiguous.
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static const clock_t_::time_point kBase = clock_t_::time_point{} + 1000h;
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TEST(BanTracker, UnknownIpIsNotBlocked) {
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BanTracker bt;
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EXPECT_FALSE(bt.is_blocked("1.2.3.4", kBase));
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}
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TEST(BanTracker, BlocksOnlyAfterMoreThanThreshold) {
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BanTracker bt; // default threshold = 3, so block on the 4th failure
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EXPECT_FALSE(bt.record_offense("1.2.3.4", kBase).blocked); // 1
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EXPECT_FALSE(bt.record_offense("1.2.3.4", kBase).blocked); // 2
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EXPECT_FALSE(bt.record_offense("1.2.3.4", kBase).blocked); // 3
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EXPECT_FALSE(bt.is_blocked("1.2.3.4", kBase));
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auto r = bt.record_offense("1.2.3.4", kBase); // 4
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EXPECT_TRUE(r.blocked);
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EXPECT_EQ(r.count, 4);
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EXPECT_TRUE(bt.is_blocked("1.2.3.4", kBase));
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}
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TEST(BanTracker, TracksEachIpIndependently) {
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BanTracker bt;
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for (int i = 0; i < 4; ++i) {
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bt.record_offense("1.1.1.1", kBase);
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}
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EXPECT_TRUE(bt.is_blocked("1.1.1.1", kBase));
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EXPECT_FALSE(bt.is_blocked("2.2.2.2", kBase));
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}
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TEST(BanTracker, OffensesAgeOutOfRollingWindow) {
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BanTracker bt;
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// Four failures spread over a couple of hours -> blocked.
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for (int i = 0; i < 4; ++i) {
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bt.record_offense("1.2.3.4", kBase + i * 1h);
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}
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EXPECT_TRUE(bt.is_blocked("1.2.3.4", kBase + 3h));
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// 24h after the first failure, that one drops out of the window: only 3
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// remain, so the IP is no longer blocked.
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EXPECT_FALSE(bt.is_blocked("1.2.3.4", kBase + 24h + 1min));
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}
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TEST(BanTracker, WindowBoundaryIsExclusiveAtCutoff) {
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BanTracker bt;
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// Exactly window-old timestamps are pruned (cutoff is inclusive of <=).
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bt.record_offense("1.2.3.4", kBase);
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auto r = bt.record_offense("1.2.3.4", kBase + 24h);
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EXPECT_EQ(r.count, 1); // the kBase entry was pruned before appending
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}
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TEST(BanTracker, SweepRemovesFullyExpiredIp) {
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BanTracker bt;
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for (int i = 0; i < 4; ++i) {
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bt.record_offense("1.2.3.4", kBase);
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}
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EXPECT_EQ(bt.tracked(), 1u);
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bt.sweep(kBase + 24h + 1min); // all offenses aged out
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EXPECT_EQ(bt.tracked(), 0u);
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}
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TEST(BanTracker, SweepKeepsStillActiveIp) {
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BanTracker bt;
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for (int i = 0; i < 4; ++i) {
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bt.record_offense("1.2.3.4", kBase);
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}
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bt.sweep(kBase + 1h); // still inside the window
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EXPECT_EQ(bt.tracked(), 1u);
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EXPECT_TRUE(bt.is_blocked("1.2.3.4", kBase + 1h));
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}
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TEST(BanTracker, RespectsCustomConfig) {
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BanTracker bt(BanTracker::Config{/*threshold=*/1, /*window=*/1h});
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EXPECT_FALSE(bt.record_offense("9.9.9.9", kBase).blocked); // 1, not > 1
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EXPECT_TRUE(bt.record_offense("9.9.9.9", kBase).blocked); // 2 > 1
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EXPECT_TRUE(bt.is_blocked("9.9.9.9", kBase));
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EXPECT_FALSE(bt.is_blocked("9.9.9.9", kBase + 1h + 1min)); // window elapsed
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}
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static bool bannable(const char *ip) {
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return is_bannable_address(boost::asio::ip::make_address(ip));
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}
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TEST(BannableAddress, GlobalIpv4IsBannable) {
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EXPECT_TRUE(bannable("8.8.8.8"));
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EXPECT_TRUE(bannable("192.184.167.198")); // a real scanner seen in the logs
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EXPECT_TRUE(bannable("1.2.3.4"));
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}
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TEST(BannableAddress, PrivateAndLocalIpv4AreNotBannable) {
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EXPECT_FALSE(bannable("127.0.0.1")); // loopback
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EXPECT_FALSE(bannable("10.1.2.3")); // 10/8
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EXPECT_FALSE(bannable("172.20.0.1")); // Docker bridge gateway (172.16/12)
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EXPECT_FALSE(bannable("172.31.255.1"));
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EXPECT_FALSE(bannable("192.168.1.104")); // the finger jail's own LAN IP
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EXPECT_FALSE(bannable("169.254.10.1")); // link-local
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EXPECT_FALSE(bannable("224.0.0.1")); // multicast
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}
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TEST(BannableAddress, CgnatRangeIsNotBannable) {
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EXPECT_FALSE(bannable("100.64.0.1")); // bottom of 100.64/10 (CGNAT/Tailscale)
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EXPECT_FALSE(bannable("100.127.255.1")); // top of the range
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EXPECT_TRUE(bannable("100.63.255.1")); // just below the range -> public
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EXPECT_TRUE(bannable("100.128.0.1")); // just above the range -> public
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}
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TEST(BannableAddress, Ipv6Classification) {
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EXPECT_TRUE(bannable("2001:4860:4860::8888")); // global
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EXPECT_FALSE(bannable("::1")); // loopback
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EXPECT_FALSE(bannable("fe80::1")); // link-local
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EXPECT_FALSE(bannable("fc00::1")); // unique-local
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EXPECT_FALSE(bannable("fd12:3456::1")); // unique-local
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}
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int main(int argc, char **argv) {
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::testing::InitGoogleTest(&argc, argv);
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return RUN_ALL_TESTS();
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}
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