8 Commits

Include renames

Author	SHA1	Message	Date
pmb	0b0842dc9d	Switch IP-scrutiny auto-blocks to hard reject (sign_up_block)	2026-07-15 17:39:48 -07:00
pmb	b39528ac30	Block the whole network for a flagged signup, not just its /32 ... register_ip_block always blocked the exact signup IP as a /32 (or /128 for v6), which is close to pointless for the datacenter/VPN/proxy space these flags fire on: a repeat bad actor from the same provider almost never reuses the exact same address, but very often reuses a different one in the same block. classify_signup_ip now returns a fourth value, block_cidr — ipapi.is's asn.route CIDR when it's a valid network that actually contains the signup IP (already being tracked in ipapi_range_cache purely for lookup caching), falling back to the address's own /32 or /128 when no usable route exists. register_ip_block blocks that instead of always deriving a /32 itself. Added range_cache_tests() covering the cache/fallback logic directly (pure sqlite + ipaddress, no network), and updated the existing ip_scrutiny_tests()/combined_signal_tests() mocks for the new 4-tuple classify_signup_ip return and register_ip_block arity.	2026-07-15 10:25:14 -07:00
pmb	0356fe7997	Replace RDAP/ipwhois signup-IP classifier with ipapi.is ... Flags datacenter, vpn, proxy, tor, and independently-scored abuser signals instead of regex-matching RDAP org names; anonymous tier covers 1000 req/day, well above signup volume.	2026-07-06 08:57:55 -07:00
pmb	8b0e1eb5ab	Lower suspicious-sweep grace window from 24h to 1h, tighten sweep cadence to 10min ... Datacenter/hosting-IP-flagged signups are a strong enough spam signal on their own that a full day of grace was mostly just delaying an inevitable suspend. Cron cadence tightened from hourly to every 10 minutes so real latency stays close to the new 1h window.	2026-07-06 07:07:43 -07:00
pmb	9924e06b5a	Add suspicious-signup sweep: suspend flagged signups with no activity ... Watches every account flagged by IP-scrutiny or email-domain scrutiny at signup and, once it goes live, records a baseline post/follow count. A scheduled sweep (app/suspicious_sweep.py, run via cron on admin.yttrx.com) suspends any watch past SUSPICIOUS_GRACE_HOURS with zero new posts and zero new follows since that baseline; any activity clears the watch. Works whether yttrx is open-registration or requires moderator approval, since the watch starts at whichever event actually makes the account live (account.created vs account.approved), same dual handling the welcome flow already uses. Needs ABUSE_BOT_TOKEN re-minted with admin:read:accounts.	2026-07-05 10:22:39 -07:00
waffle2k	656eec09c0	Add disposable/high-risk email signup scrutiny via check-mail.org ... Classifies each signup's email domain (domain-only, GDPR-friendly) alongside the existing IP scrutiny signal, with matching held-welcome and auto email_domain_block behavior. A report against an account with a flagged domain suspends immediately (no reporter-count threshold) and blocks the domain, classified live from the report payload rather than any signup-time record so it also covers pre-existing accounts. Ships CHECK_MAIL_DRY_RUN=true by default, independent of ABUSE_DRY_RUN, so the new report-triggered suspend path stays inert until watched.	2026-07-03 09:08:30 -07:00
pmb	37577fbb56	Add welcomebot-signups CLI to inspect signup-IP classification history	2026-07-02 16:53:36 -07:00
pmb	c0e5df3cc4	Initial commit: welcome-bot, abuse-bot, dormant-sweep, IP signup scrutiny	2026-07-02 16:22:30 -07:00