"""Local smoke test: signature verification, payload routing, abuse policy.

Run after `pip install -r requirements.txt`:
    WEBHOOK_SECRET=testsecret BOT_ACCESS_TOKEN=x python test_local.py

It uses FastAPI's TestClient and monkeypatches every outbound Mastodon call,
so it makes no network requests.
"""

import hashlib
import hmac
import json
import os
from datetime import datetime, timedelta, timezone

os.environ.setdefault("WEBHOOK_SECRET", "testsecret")
os.environ.setdefault("BOT_ACCESS_TOKEN", "dummy")
os.environ.setdefault("ABUSE_BOT_TOKEN", "dummy-admin")
os.environ.setdefault("ABUSE_DRY_RUN", "false")
os.environ.setdefault("MOD_ALERT_ACCT", "pete")
os.environ.setdefault("DB_PATH", "/tmp/welcomebot-test.db")

if os.path.exists(os.environ["DB_PATH"]):
    os.remove(os.environ["DB_PATH"])

from fastapi.testclient import TestClient  # noqa: E402

import app.main as main  # noqa: E402

# Capture welcome calls instead of hitting the network.
sent = []
main.send_welcome = lambda account_id, acct: sent.append((account_id, acct))

# Capture report handling at the route boundary for the routing test.
reports = []
_real_handle_report = main.handle_report
main.handle_report = lambda *a: reports.append(a)

client = TestClient(main.app)


def sign(body: bytes) -> str:
    return "sha256=" + hmac.new(b"testsecret", body, hashlib.sha256).hexdigest()


def post(payload, secret_ok=True):
    body = json.dumps(payload).encode()
    sig = sign(body) if secret_ok else "sha256=deadbeef"
    return client.post(
        "/webhook", content=body,
        headers={"X-Hub-Signature": sig, "Content-Type": "application/json"},
    )


def days_ago(n):
    return (datetime.now(timezone.utc) - timedelta(days=n)).isoformat()


def routing_tests():
    # 1. health
    assert client.get("/healthz").json() == {"ok": True}

    # 2. bad signature rejected
    r = post({"event": "account.created", "object": {}}, secret_ok=False)
    assert r.status_code == 401, r.status_code

    # 3. missing signature rejected
    body = json.dumps({"event": "account.created"}).encode()
    assert client.post("/webhook", content=body).status_code == 401

    # 4. valid account.created -> queued
    payload = {
        "event": "account.created",
        "object": {
            "id": "1001", "username": "alice", "domain": None,
            "account": {"id": "1001", "username": "alice", "acct": "alice",
                        "url": "https://yttrx.com/@alice"},
        },
    }
    r = post(payload)
    assert r.status_code == 200, r.text
    assert r.json().get("queued") == "alice", r.json()
    assert sent == [("1001", "alice")], sent

    # 5. report.created -> routed to handle_report with extracted fields
    r = post({
        "event": "report.created",
        "object": {
            "id": "55", "category": "spam",
            "target_account": {
                "id": "777", "username": "spammer", "domain": None,
                "suspended": False, "silenced": False,
                "account": {"id": "777", "acct": "spammer"},
            },
        },
    })
    assert r.status_code == 200, r.text
    assert r.json().get("report") == "55", r.json()
    # (report_id, target_id, acct, is_local, suspended, silenced, privileged)
    assert reports == [("55", "777", "spammer", True, False, False, False)], reports

    # 5b. report against a staff account -> privileged=True extracted from role
    r = post({
        "event": "report.created",
        "object": {
            "id": "56",
            "target_account": {
                "id": "778", "username": "waffles", "domain": None,
                "suspended": False, "silenced": False,
                "role": {"id": 3, "name": "Owner", "permissions": "1"},
                "account": {"id": "778", "acct": "waffles"},
            },
        },
    })
    assert reports[-1] == ("56", "778", "waffles", True, False, False, True), reports[-1]

    # 6. account.approved also welcomes — but dedup means alice (id 1001,
    #    already welcomed via account.created above) is not welcomed twice.
    r = post({
        "event": "account.approved",
        "object": {"id": "1001", "username": "alice", "domain": None,
                   "account": {"id": "1001", "acct": "alice"}},
    })
    assert r.status_code == 200, r.text
    assert r.json().get("queued") == "alice", r.json()
    # send_welcome is stubbed to append; real dedup is exercised in policy run.
    # A brand-new account via account.approved should also route to welcome.
    r = post({
        "event": "account.approved",
        "object": {"id": "2002", "username": "carol", "domain": None,
                   "account": {"id": "2002", "acct": "carol"}},
    })
    assert r.json().get("queued") == "carol", r.json()
    assert ("2002", "carol") in sent, sent

    # 7. truly unknown event ignored
    r = post({"event": "status.updated", "object": {"id": "5"}})
    assert r.json().get("ignored") == "status.updated", r.json()

    # 8. remote account skipped when LOCAL_ONLY (welcome)
    r = post({
        "event": "account.created",
        "object": {"id": "9", "username": "bob", "domain": "other.social",
                   "account": {"id": "9", "acct": "bob@other.social"}},
    })
    assert r.json().get("skipped"), r.json()


def policy_tests():
    """Drive handle_report directly with stubbed Mastodon calls."""
    main.handle_report = _real_handle_report

    actions, dms, user_dms = [], [], []
    main.apply_action = lambda target_id, action, text: actions.append((target_id, action))
    main.dm_moderator = lambda message: dms.append(message)
    main.dm_silenced_user = lambda acct: user_dms.append(acct)

    def run(target_id, acct, *, profile, sources, **kw):
        main.classify_account = lambda tid: profile
        main.count_distinct_reporters = lambda tid: sources
        defaults = dict(is_local=True, suspended=False, silenced=False, privileged=False)
        defaults.update(kw)
        main.handle_report("R", target_id, acct, defaults["is_local"],
                           defaults["suspended"], defaults["silenced"],
                           defaults["privileged"])

    young = {"has_posts": True, "young": True, "dormant": False,
             "newest_at": None, "oldest_seen": None, "truncated": False}
    active = {"has_posts": True, "young": False, "dormant": False,
              "newest_at": None, "oldest_seen": None, "truncated": False}
    dormant = {"has_posts": True, "young": False, "dormant": True,
               "newest_at": None, "oldest_seen": None, "truncated": False}
    noposts = {"has_posts": False, "young": False, "dormant": False,
               "newest_at": None, "oldest_seen": None, "truncated": False}

    # young, 1 source -> below threshold (needs 2), no action
    run("1", "y1", profile=young, sources=1)
    assert actions == [], actions

    # young, 2 sources -> silenced; both the mod and the user are DMed
    run("2", "y2", profile=young, sources=2)
    assert ("2", "silence") in actions, actions
    assert any("y2" in d for d in dms), dms
    assert "y2" in user_dms, user_dms

    # dormant, 2 sources -> silenced
    run("3", "d1", profile=dormant, sources=2)
    assert ("3", "silence") in actions, actions

    # active, 2 sources -> below threshold (needs 3), no action
    run("4", "a1", profile=active, sources=2)
    assert ("4", "silence") not in actions, actions

    # active, 3 sources -> silenced
    run("5", "a2", profile=active, sources=3)
    assert ("5", "silence") in actions, actions

    # no-posts, 2 sources -> silenced (grouped with young/dormant)
    run("6", "n1", profile=noposts, sources=2)
    assert ("6", "silence") in actions, actions

    # already silenced -> skipped even with enough sources
    run("7", "s1", profile=young, sources=5, silenced=True)
    assert ("7", "silence") not in actions, actions

    # remote -> skipped (ABUSE_LOCAL_ONLY)
    run("8", "r1@elsewhere", profile=young, sources=5, is_local=False)
    assert ("8", "silence") not in actions, actions

    # privileged (staff role) -> skipped even with plenty of sources
    run("9", "waffles", profile=young, sources=9, privileged=True)
    assert ("9", "silence") not in actions, actions

    # dedup: re-running an already-actioned target takes no new action
    before = len(actions)
    run("2", "y2", profile=young, sources=9)
    assert len(actions) == before, "expected dedup to suppress repeat action"


def ip_scrutiny_tests():
    """Drive process_signup + the abuse threshold override, network stubbed out."""
    sent = []
    dms = []
    ipblocks = []
    main.send_welcome = lambda account_id, acct: sent.append((account_id, acct))
    main.dm_moderator = lambda message: dms.append(message)
    main.register_ip_block = lambda ip, acct, org: ipblocks.append((ip, acct, org))

    def classify(ip):
        return classifications[ip]

    classifications = {
        "203.0.113.10": ("residential", "Example Residential ISP"),
        "198.51.100.20": ("datacenter", "Example Cloud Hosting Inc"),
        "198.51.100.21": ("datacenter", "Example Cloud Hosting Inc"),
    }
    main.classify_signup_ip = classify

    main.IP_SCRUTINY_ENABLED = True

    # A. residential IP -> welcomed immediately, no ip-block, no flag recorded.
    main.IP_SCRUTINY_DRY_RUN = False
    main.IP_SCRUTINY_HOLD_WELCOME = True
    main.IP_SCRUTINY_AUTO_IPBLOCK = True
    main.process_signup("101", "res1", "203.0.113.10")
    assert ("101", "res1") in sent, sent
    assert ipblocks == [], ipblocks
    assert main.get_signup_flag("101") is False, "residential signup should not be flagged"

    # B. datacenter IP, HOLD_WELCOME + AUTO_IPBLOCK, live (not dry-run) ->
    #    welcome held, ip-block registered, moderator DM'd; account.approved
    #    later releases the welcome.
    sent.clear(); dms.clear(); ipblocks.clear()
    main.process_signup("102", "dc1", "198.51.100.20")
    assert ("102", "dc1") not in sent, "welcome should be held for a flagged signup"
    assert ipblocks == [("198.51.100.20", "dc1", "Example Cloud Hosting Inc")], ipblocks
    assert any("dc1" in d and "held" in d for d in dms), dms
    assert main.get_signup_flag("102") is True

    main.send_welcome("102", "dc1")  # simulate account.approved's unconditional welcome
    assert ("102", "dc1") in sent, sent

    # C. same datacenter IP, but IP_SCRUTINY_DRY_RUN -> welcomed immediately
    #    (no hold), no ip-block write, DM carries the dry-run prefix.
    sent.clear(); dms.clear(); ipblocks.clear()
    main.IP_SCRUTINY_DRY_RUN = True
    main.process_signup("103", "dc2", "198.51.100.21")
    assert ("103", "dc2") in sent, "dry-run must not hold the welcome"
    assert ipblocks == [], "dry-run must not write an ip_block"
    assert any(d.startswith("[DRY-RUN]") for d in dms), dms

    # D. abuse threshold override: a flagged account needs only
    #    IP_SCRUTINY_ABUSE_THRESHOLD (1) distinct reporter to silence, vs. the
    #    normal young-tier threshold of 2 for an unflagged account.
    main.IP_SCRUTINY_DRY_RUN = False
    main.dm_moderator = lambda message: dms.append(message)
    main.handle_report = _real_handle_report
    actions = []
    main.apply_action = lambda target_id, action, text: actions.append((target_id, action))
    main.dm_silenced_user = lambda acct: None
    young = {"has_posts": True, "young": True, "dormant": False,
             "newest_at": None, "oldest_seen": None, "truncated": False}
    main.classify_account = lambda tid: young
    main.count_distinct_reporters = lambda tid: 1

    # "102" (dc1) was flagged above -> 1 reporter is enough.
    main.handle_report("R2", "102", "dc1", True, False, False, False)
    assert ("102", "silence") in actions, actions

    # "101" (res1) was not flagged -> 1 reporter stays below the tier's usual
    # threshold of 2.
    main.handle_report("R3", "101", "res1", True, False, False, False)
    assert ("101", "silence") not in actions, actions


if __name__ == "__main__":
    routing_tests()
    policy_tests()
    ip_scrutiny_tests()
    print("ALL TESTS PASSED")