Files
finger/test_ban.cpp
pmb da4fa18525
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Add FINGER_BAN_ALLOWLIST to exempt trusted front-end IPs from banning
The per-IP ban tracker treats every globally-routable client equally, but an
aggregating front-end like the finger-web proxy funnels the whole internet's
federated lookups through a single IP. A burst from any one client of the proxy
(or a load test) is then attributed to the proxy's IP and, once it crosses the
failure threshold, the daemon blocks the proxy — taking out finger lookups for
everyone. Per-client abuse protection for the proxied path belongs in the proxy
(which now rate-limits per real client IP), so the daemon should trust it.

Add a FINGER_BAN_ALLOWLIST env var (comma-separated IPs). Allowlisted addresses
are marked non-trackable in the listener, so their connections are never blocked
and never recorded as offenses. Unset = unchanged behaviour.

- parse_ip_allowlist() in ban.cpp (trims entries, skips blanks) + unit tests
- listener() consults the set when computing 'trackable'
- documented in docker-compose.yml and DOCKER.md
2026-06-17 10:44:47 -07:00

153 lines
5.3 KiB
C++

#include "ban.hpp"
#include <boost/asio/ip/address.hpp>
#include <gtest/gtest.h>
using namespace std::chrono_literals;
using clock_t_ = BanTracker::clock;
// Work well away from the steady_clock epoch so that subtracting the window
// never underflows and default-constructed time_points are unambiguous.
static const clock_t_::time_point kBase = clock_t_::time_point{} + 1000h;
TEST(BanTracker, UnknownIpIsNotBlocked) {
BanTracker bt;
EXPECT_FALSE(bt.is_blocked("1.2.3.4", kBase));
}
TEST(BanTracker, BlocksOnlyAfterMoreThanThreshold) {
BanTracker bt; // default threshold = 3, so block on the 4th failure
EXPECT_FALSE(bt.record_offense("1.2.3.4", kBase).blocked); // 1
EXPECT_FALSE(bt.record_offense("1.2.3.4", kBase).blocked); // 2
EXPECT_FALSE(bt.record_offense("1.2.3.4", kBase).blocked); // 3
EXPECT_FALSE(bt.is_blocked("1.2.3.4", kBase));
auto r = bt.record_offense("1.2.3.4", kBase); // 4
EXPECT_TRUE(r.blocked);
EXPECT_EQ(r.count, 4);
EXPECT_TRUE(bt.is_blocked("1.2.3.4", kBase));
}
TEST(BanTracker, TracksEachIpIndependently) {
BanTracker bt;
for (int i = 0; i < 4; ++i) {
bt.record_offense("1.1.1.1", kBase);
}
EXPECT_TRUE(bt.is_blocked("1.1.1.1", kBase));
EXPECT_FALSE(bt.is_blocked("2.2.2.2", kBase));
}
TEST(BanTracker, OffensesAgeOutOfRollingWindow) {
BanTracker bt;
// Four failures spread over a couple of hours -> blocked.
for (int i = 0; i < 4; ++i) {
bt.record_offense("1.2.3.4", kBase + i * 1h);
}
EXPECT_TRUE(bt.is_blocked("1.2.3.4", kBase + 3h));
// 24h after the first failure, that one drops out of the window: only 3
// remain, so the IP is no longer blocked.
EXPECT_FALSE(bt.is_blocked("1.2.3.4", kBase + 24h + 1min));
}
TEST(BanTracker, WindowBoundaryIsExclusiveAtCutoff) {
BanTracker bt;
// Exactly window-old timestamps are pruned (cutoff is inclusive of <=).
bt.record_offense("1.2.3.4", kBase);
auto r = bt.record_offense("1.2.3.4", kBase + 24h);
EXPECT_EQ(r.count, 1); // the kBase entry was pruned before appending
}
TEST(BanTracker, SweepRemovesFullyExpiredIp) {
BanTracker bt;
for (int i = 0; i < 4; ++i) {
bt.record_offense("1.2.3.4", kBase);
}
EXPECT_EQ(bt.tracked(), 1u);
bt.sweep(kBase + 24h + 1min); // all offenses aged out
EXPECT_EQ(bt.tracked(), 0u);
}
TEST(BanTracker, SweepKeepsStillActiveIp) {
BanTracker bt;
for (int i = 0; i < 4; ++i) {
bt.record_offense("1.2.3.4", kBase);
}
bt.sweep(kBase + 1h); // still inside the window
EXPECT_EQ(bt.tracked(), 1u);
EXPECT_TRUE(bt.is_blocked("1.2.3.4", kBase + 1h));
}
TEST(BanTracker, RespectsCustomConfig) {
BanTracker bt(BanTracker::Config{/*threshold=*/1, /*window=*/1h});
EXPECT_FALSE(bt.record_offense("9.9.9.9", kBase).blocked); // 1, not > 1
EXPECT_TRUE(bt.record_offense("9.9.9.9", kBase).blocked); // 2 > 1
EXPECT_TRUE(bt.is_blocked("9.9.9.9", kBase));
EXPECT_FALSE(bt.is_blocked("9.9.9.9", kBase + 1h + 1min)); // window elapsed
}
static bool bannable(const char *ip) {
return is_bannable_address(boost::asio::ip::make_address(ip));
}
TEST(BannableAddress, GlobalIpv4IsBannable) {
EXPECT_TRUE(bannable("8.8.8.8"));
EXPECT_TRUE(bannable("192.184.167.198")); // a real scanner seen in the logs
EXPECT_TRUE(bannable("1.2.3.4"));
}
TEST(BannableAddress, PrivateAndLocalIpv4AreNotBannable) {
EXPECT_FALSE(bannable("127.0.0.1")); // loopback
EXPECT_FALSE(bannable("10.1.2.3")); // 10/8
EXPECT_FALSE(bannable("172.20.0.1")); // Docker bridge gateway (172.16/12)
EXPECT_FALSE(bannable("172.31.255.1"));
EXPECT_FALSE(bannable("192.168.1.104")); // the finger jail's own LAN IP
EXPECT_FALSE(bannable("169.254.10.1")); // link-local
EXPECT_FALSE(bannable("224.0.0.1")); // multicast
}
TEST(BannableAddress, CgnatRangeIsNotBannable) {
EXPECT_FALSE(bannable("100.64.0.1")); // bottom of 100.64/10 (CGNAT/Tailscale)
EXPECT_FALSE(bannable("100.127.255.1")); // top of the range
EXPECT_TRUE(bannable("100.63.255.1")); // just below the range -> public
EXPECT_TRUE(bannable("100.128.0.1")); // just above the range -> public
}
TEST(BannableAddress, Ipv6Classification) {
EXPECT_TRUE(bannable("2001:4860:4860::8888")); // global
EXPECT_FALSE(bannable("::1")); // loopback
EXPECT_FALSE(bannable("fe80::1")); // link-local
EXPECT_FALSE(bannable("fc00::1")); // unique-local
EXPECT_FALSE(bannable("fd12:3456::1")); // unique-local
}
TEST(IpAllowlist, ParsesCommaSeparatedTrimmedEntries) {
auto a = parse_ip_allowlist("147.182.255.203, 10.0.0.1 ,\t2a01:4f8:190:7447::2");
EXPECT_EQ(a.size(), 3u);
EXPECT_TRUE(a.count("147.182.255.203"));
EXPECT_TRUE(a.count("10.0.0.1"));
EXPECT_TRUE(a.count("2a01:4f8:190:7447::2"));
}
TEST(IpAllowlist, SingleEntryNoCommas) {
auto a = parse_ip_allowlist("147.182.255.203");
EXPECT_EQ(a.size(), 1u);
EXPECT_TRUE(a.count("147.182.255.203"));
}
TEST(IpAllowlist, EmptyAndBlankYieldEmptySet) {
EXPECT_TRUE(parse_ip_allowlist("").empty());
EXPECT_TRUE(parse_ip_allowlist(" ").empty());
EXPECT_TRUE(parse_ip_allowlist(",, ,\t,").empty()); // only separators/blanks
}
TEST(IpAllowlist, IgnoresEmptyEntriesBetweenCommas) {
auto a = parse_ip_allowlist("8.8.8.8,,9.9.9.9,");
EXPECT_EQ(a.size(), 2u);
EXPECT_TRUE(a.count("8.8.8.8"));
EXPECT_TRUE(a.count("9.9.9.9"));
}
int main(int argc, char **argv) {
::testing::InitGoogleTest(&argc, argv);
return RUN_ALL_TESTS();
}